INTRODUCTION
In the last half century, two works have marked what can be called conceptual breakthroughs in our apprehension of the Holocaust. The first was Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem, which appeared in the US in 1963 as a report on the Eichmann trial held in Israel in 1961. The second was the film Shoah by Claude Lanzmann, which first appeared in France in [Vol. 1:465 11 Phil. & Soc. Criticism 20 (1985) (Melvin A. Hill ed., 1979) .
3 "When I speak of the banality of evil," Arendt explains in the Postscript to Eichmann in Jerusalem, "I do so only on the strictly factual level, pointing to a phenomenon that stared one in the face at the trial. Eichmann was not lago and not Macbeth ... Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement, he had no motives at all ... He merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what he was doing." Arendt, supra note 1, at 287 (emphasis added). 4 "Arendt insisted," Pnina Lahav writes, "that 'civilized jurisprudence prided itself ... [most] on ... taking into account ... the subjective factor' of mens rea. But the Nazis formed a new category of criminals, men and women who did not possess mens rea. This new category, Arendt insisted, had to be recognized as a matter of
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question is not "how can evil (Eichmann) be so banal?" but "how can the banality of evil be addressed in legal terms 5 and by legal means?" On what law." Arendt, supra note 1, at 276-77; Lahav, supra note 1, at 570 (emphasis added) (citing Arendt, supra note 1, at 276-77). My emphasis is slightly different. I see the crux of Arendt's concept of "banality of evil" not only in the new conception of "a criminal without mens rea," but in the added legal and linguistic factor of the superimposition of a borrowed (Nazi) language -of recognizable and structuring cliches -on this absence of subjective motive. Eichmann's quasi-parodic German, a German limited to an anachronistic use of Nazi bureaucratic jargon (noticeable during the trial by every native German speaker as the farcical survival of a sort of robot-language), takes the place of mens rea. This unintentional linguistic parody that substitutes for mens rea is what makes Arendt call Eichmann "a clown" (Arendt, supra note 1, at 54) and view in general the German-language version of the trial as "sheer comedy" (a comedy compounded by a farcical, inadequate simultaneous translation into German) (Arendt, supra note 1, at 3, 48). "The German text of the taped police examination ... corrected and approved by Eichmann, constitutes a veritable gold mine," writes Arendt, in showing how "the horrible can be not only ludicrous but outright funny. Some of the comedy cannot be conveyed in English, because it lies in Eichmann's heroic fight with the German language, which invariably defeats him ... Dimly aware of a defect that ... [during the trial] amounted to a slight case of aphasia -he apologized, saying, 'Officialese [Amtssprache] is my only language.' But the point here is that officialese became his language because he was genuinely incapable of uttering a single sentence that was not a clichg ... what he said was always the same, expressed in the same words.
The longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else. No communication was possible with him, not because he lied but because he was surrounded by the most reliable safeguards against the words and the presence of others, and hence against reality as such." Arendt, supra note 1, at 48-49 (emphasis added). As a parrot-like "clown," Eichmann does not speak the borrowed (Nazi) language: he is rather spoken by it, spoken for by its cliches, whose criminality he does not come to realize. This total loss of a sense of reality regarding Nazis crimes is what encapsulates, for Arendt, the utmost moral scandal (the ventriloquized mens rea, the criminal linguistic "banality") typified by Eichmann. Eichmann's continued impersonation during the trial (his autistic ventriloquism) of technocratic Nazi language is what incriminates him above all in Arendt's eyes. (In this sense, it is perhaps symbolic that, as the prosecutor noted, "Eichmann almost never looked into the courtroom." Gideon Hausner, Justice in Jerusalem 332 (1966) .) 5 For a similar emphasis on the jurisprudential essence of "the banality of evil," but from a different interpretive perspective, see Laurence Douglas, The Memory of Judgement: The Law, the Holocaust and Denial, 7 Hist. & Memory 100 (1996) .
("The banality of evil thus can be understood to describe a bureaucratic and a legal phenomenon. Organizationally removed from the mass killing they sanctioned, functionaries such as Eichmann could claim to have participated in the Final Solution out of a feeling of legal obligation. So conceived, the Holocaust could be [Vol. 1:465 Theaters of Justice new legal grounds can the law mete out the utmost punishment precisely to banality or to the lack of mens rea? How can the absence of mens rea in the execution of a genocide become itself the highest -and not just the newest -crime against humanity? 6 "We have to combat all impulses to mythologize the horrible," writes Arendt:
Perhaps what is behind it all is that individual human beings did not kill other individual human beings for human reasons, but that an organized attempt was made to eradicate the concept of the human being.
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If evil is linguistically and legally banal (devoid of human motivations, and occurring through clich6s which screen human reality and actuality), in what ways, Arendt asks, can the law become an anchor and a guarantee, a guardian of humanity? How can the law fight over language with this radical banality (the total identification with a borrowed language)? When language itself becomes subsumed by the banality of evil, how can the law keep meaning to the word "humanity"? The crux of Arendt's book, I thus will argue, is not to define evil, but to reflect on the significance of legal meaning in the wake of the Holocaust.
If the banality of evil designates a gap between event and explanations, how can the law deal with this gap? The Eichmann trial must decide not just the guilt of the defendant, but how these questions can be answered. How, moreover, can a crime that is historically unprecedented be litigated, understood, and judged in a discipline of precedents? When precedents fall viewed as the perfection, rather than as the perversion, of legal positivism -the idea that the legitimacy of a legal command derives from its status as law, and not from any underlying normative content." Id. at 108 (emphasis added).) 6 This, in my eyes, is the quintessence of Arendt's paradox and of her unexpected legal reading of the crime. This reading stands, of course, in a sharp contrast to the prosecution's version and to the court's juridical interpretation, both of which attributed to Eichmann undoubtable mens rea, or a hyperbolic ("monstrous," monstrously self-conscious, and self-willed) criminal intention: "Eichmann," wrote Supreme Court Justice Simon Agranat, "performed the extermination order at all times and in all seasons con amore ... with genuine zeal and devotion to that objective." Cr. A. 336/61, Eichmann v. Attorney General, 16 P.D. 2033 , 2099 Eichmann Supreme Court Opinion, 1-70 (English) , cited in Pnina Lahav, Judgement in Jerusalem. Chief Justice Simon Agranat and the Zionist Century 157 (1997) . For an elaborate account of the court's views in this and other legal matters, see id. at 145-62. 7 Letter 50, in Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Correspondence: 1926 -1969 , at 69 (Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner eds. & Robert Kimber & Rita Kimber trans., 1992 .
20001 [Vol. 1:465 short, Arendt will ask, what is the role of legal history and legal memory? How can memory be used for the redefinition of a legal meaning that will be remembered in its turn, in such a way that the unprecedented can become a precedent in its own right -a precedent that might prevent an all too likely future repetition? What is the redefined legal relation between repetition and the new, and how does this relation affect the recreation of authoritative legal meaning for the future? These are, I will propose, the restless questions that bring Arendt to Jerusalem. "Israel has the right to speak for the victims," writes Arendt to her German friend and mentor, Karl Jaspers, "because the large majority of them are living in Israel now as citizens":
The trial will take place in the country in which the injured parties and those who happen to survive are. You say that Israel didn't even exist then. But one could say that it was for the sake of these victims that Palestine became Israel ... In addition, Eichmann was responsible for Jews and Jews only ... The country or state to which the victims belong has jurisdiction ...
All this may strike you as though I too was attempting to circumscribe the political with legal concepts. And I even admit that as far as the law is concerned, I have been infected by the AngloSaxon influence. But quite apart from that, it seems to me to be in the nature of this case that we have no tools to hand except legal ones with which we have to judge and pass sentence on something that cannot even be adequately represented either in legal terms or in political terms. That is precisely what makes the process itself, namely, the trial, so exciting. 8
A. A Dissident Legal Perspective
Among the common misconceptions to which Arendt's legal stance has given rise, the most prevalent is that the book is "anti-Zionist." 9 According Benjamin, Selected Writings (1913 -1926 ) 237-52 (1997 ; Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, in Narrative, Violence and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover 203 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1995) . All these points, in summary, establish Arendt's stance (contrary to common opinion) as pro-Zionist, though critical of the Israeli government and of its handling of the trial. "How you could believe that my book was 'a mockery of Zionism,"' Arendt writes to Scholem, in a letter of reply from July 24, 1963, "would be a complete mystery to me, if I did not know that many people in Zionist circles have become incapable of listening to opinions or arguments which are off the beaten track and not consonant with their ideology. There are exceptions, and a Zionist friend of mine remarked in all innocence that the book, the last chapter in particular (recognition of the competence of the court, justification of the kidnapping), was very pro-Israel, as indeed it is. What confuses you is that my argument and my approach are different from what you are used to; in other words, the trouble is that I am independent." 'Eichmann in Jerusalem': An Exchange of Letters, supra note 2, at 55. 12 Arendt summarizes these spectacular (spectacularized) political and didactic ends:
"Thus, the trial never became a play, but the 'show' Ben Gurion had had in mind to begin with did take place, or, rather, the 'lessons' he thought should be taught to Jews and Gentiles, to Israelis and Arabs ... . These lessons ... . Ben Gurion had outlined them before the trial started, in a number of articles designed to explain why Israel had kidnapped the accused. There was the lesson to the non-Jewish world: 'We want to establish before the nations of the world how millions of people, because they happened to be Jews, and one million babies, because they happened to be Jewish babies, were murdered by the Nazis.' ... 'We want the nations of the world to know ... and they should be ashamed.' The Jews in the Diaspora were to remember how Judaism, four thousand years old ... ' had always faced 'a hostile world,' how the Jews had degenerated until they went to their death like sheep, and how only the establishment of the Jewish state had enabled the Jews to hit back, as Israelis had done in the war of Independence... . And if the Jews outside Israel had to be shown the difference between Israeli heroism and Jewish submissive meekness, there was a lesson for those inside Israel too: 'the generation of Israelis who had grown up since the holocaust' were in danger of losing their ties with the Jewish people and, by implication, with their own history. 'It is necessary that our youth remember what happened to the Jewish people. We want them to know the most tragic facts in our history.' Finally, one of the motives in bringing Eichmann to trial was to ferret out other Nazis -for example, the connection between the Nazis and some Arab rulers." Arendt, supra note 1, at 9-10. These well known and And Justice, though perhaps an "abstraction" for those of Mr. Ben Gurion's turn of mind, proves to be a much sterner master than the Prime Minister with all his power. 14 In this dramatic confrontation between Justice and the State, Arendt sees her role as that of serving, in her turn, the "much sterner master." It is against the more "permissive" rule of the competing master -the Prime Minister -that she enlists at once he; analytic skills, her legal erudition, and her most biting sense of irony. She thus proceeds from the determination to speak truth to power. Standing up against the State, she mobilizes law in an attempt to build a dissident legal perspective. Rather than call her "anti-Zionist," we may want to propose that with respect to the legal position of the State prosecuting the accused (with respect, that is, to the official Zionist legal position), she is performing what might be called, somewhat metaphorically, "critical legal studies" before its time. 5
B. The Critical Consciousness of the Event
Arendt's critique has had its own historical momentum; its dissenting legal force has paradoxically become today not only part of the event in history, but part of its notorious legal historiography. This historiography, in turn, was part of the legacy of the event. Whether we choose to accept or to reject its controversial premises, Arendt's trial report, I will here argue, at once proves and seals the impact of the trial as a true event.' 6 "Like truth," writes the historian Pierre Nora, "the event is always revolutionary, the grain of sand in the machine, the accident that shakes us up and takes us by surprise ... It is best circumscribed from the outside: what is the event and for whom? For if there is no event without critical consciousness, there is an event only when, offered to everybody, it is not the same for all." 17 to unmask the strategies of power that disguise themselves in the proceedings of the law; both critically lay bare the political nature of legal institutions and of trials. But whereas the later legal movement challenges in principle the presumed line of demarcation between law and politics, Arendt's critique is driven, on the contrary, by a demand for purer justice -or by a claim for a strict separation between the legal and the political in the Eichmann trial.
On critical legal studies and legal scholars' challenges to the law/politics boundary, see Critical Legal Studies (James Boyle ed., 1992) My argument, however, is that Arendt's very presence at the trial and her impact on the historiography and on the memory of the event precisely prove that the event has gone beyond the known parameters that were set as its limits and has reached over to some new parameters that were unknown and unexpected. Certainly, the state has not planned, and no one could have expected, Arendt's charismatic contribution to the meaning and the impact of the Eichmann trial. This is one concrete example in which the event surpassed its own deliberateness. I will argue that the deepest significance of the event (the legal event as well as the historical event) lies precisely in its self-transcendence. An event is that of which the consequences are incalculable, irrespective of its conscious architecture and of its ideological intentionality. 17 Pierre Nora, Le retourde l'evinement, in I Faire de I'histoire-nouveaux problmes [Vol. 1:465 Theaters of Justice I view Arendt, in Nora's words, as "the critical consciousness of the event," "the grain of sand in the machine." This paper will explore the Eichmann trial, quite precisely in its dimension as a living, powerful event -an event whose impact is defined and measured by the fact that it is "not the same for all."
It is not the same for Arendt as for me. I respect this fact as illustrating not just the significance but the eventness of the trial. I will try to look at the event from both perspectives: Arendt's and my own. I will try to hold both viewpoints in sight of each other's critical awareness. In what follows, I will pledge my reading against Arendt's, in espousing the State's vision of the trial and in highlighting differently than Arendt what I take to be the deeper meaning of the trial and, beyond its meaning, its far-reaching repercussions as event; an event which includes Arendt and of which Arendt remains, to this day, the most memorable and the most lucid critical consciousness.
C. History for Life
In The Use and Abuse of History for Life, Nietzsche analyzes different kinds of history (different relations to the past) which are all useful, relevant to life, and whose opposing insights in fact complement each other and define each other. There is what Nietzsche-calls "monumental history," consisting in an aggrandizement, a magnification of the high points of the past as they relate to man's "struggle and action"; in contrast to this history that magnifies the past and seeks in it an inspiration, a "great impulse" for a future action, there is what Nietzsche calls "critical history" -a history "that judges and condemns" and that undercuts illusions and enthusiasms. "Critical history" derives, says Nietzsche, from man's "suffering and his desire for deliverance."
If the man who will produce something great has need of the past, he makes himself its master by means of monumental history; ... and only he whose heart is oppressed by an instant need and who will 220, 223 (Jacques Le Goff & Pierre Nora eds., 1974) (author's translation). Nora speaks of the event as a historian and as a philosopher of history. Compare, from the complementary vantage point of political theory, Arendt's own reflection on the event: "Events, past and present -not social forces and historical trends, not questionnaires and motivation research ... -are the true, the only reliable teachers of political scientists, as they are the most trustworthy source of information for those engaged in politics." Hanna Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 482 (rev. ed. 1968).
cast the burden off at any price feels the need of "critical history", the history that judges and condemns. 8 I will suggest that Arendt is, in Nietzsche's precise terms, a "critical historian" of the trial. She casts aside the version of the trial presented by the State, in an attempt to free the present from the oppressive inheritances of the past. She seeks not inspiration from the past, but liberation from the past. She strives not to erect past models, but to define a purer justice. "That virtue," Nietzsche writes, "never has a pleasing quality. It never charms; it is harsh and strident."' 9 Whereas the official State vision of the Eichmann trial is, I would propose, precisely one of "monumental history," Arendt's vision offers a substitutive "critical (legal) history." Scholem, therefore, is quite right in pointing out that Arendt's "version of events" often "seems to come between us and the events. 
II. MONUMENTAL LEGAL HISTORY
"For it was history," writes Arendt, "that, as far as the prosecution was concerned, stood in the center of the trial.
' 22 What makes of a legal case a monumental historical case is the dramatic, totalizing way in which the legal institutions undertake to put on trial history itself, thereby setting the whole world as the stage and as the audience of the trial. Nuremberg was such a case: a legal process mastering a monumental mass of evidence and technically supported by a battery of earphones and interpreters through whose performance justice was enacted as a constant process of translation and The philosophy of history and law that sees the victims as the narrative center of history and that insists on this memorial relation between law and history was best expounded by the then-prime minister of Israel, David Ben Gurion. 2 4 American journalists, who have not suffered from the Nazi atrocities, may be "objective" and deny Israel's right to try one of the greatest Nazi murderers. But the calamity inflicted on the Jewish people is not merely one part of the atrocities the Nazis committed against the world. It is a specific and unparalleled act, an act designed for the complete extermination of the Jewish people, which Hitler and his collaborators did not dare commit against any other people. It is therefore the duty of the State of Israel, the only sovereign authority in Jewry, to see that the whole of this story, in all its horror, is fully exposed -without in any way ignoring the Nazi regime's other crimes against humanity, but as a unique crime without precedent or parallel in the annals of mankind.
... It is not the penalty to be inflicted on the criminal that is the main thing -no penalty can match the magnitude of the offensebut the full exposure of the Nazi regime's infamous crimes against our people. Eichmann's acts alone are not the main point in this trial. Historic justice and the honor of the Jewish people demand this trial.
23 "In justification of the Eichmann trial," Arendt writes, "it has frequently been maintained that although the greatest crime committed during the last war had been against the Jews, the Jews had been only bystanders at Nuremberg, and the judgement of the Jerusalem court made the point that now, for the first time, the Jewish catastrophe 'occupied the central place in the court proceedings, and [that] it was this fact which distinguished this trial from those which preceded it', at Nuremberg and elsewhere." Arendt, supra note I, at 258. 24 Ben Gurion responds to the international debate and legal controversy triggered by the announcement of the trial, a world polemics in which some Western legal scholars put in question Israeli jurisdiction in calling for the constitution of a more neutral international tribunal to try Eichmann.
Historic justice and the honor of the Jewish people demand that this should be done only by an Israeli court in the sovereign Jewish State.
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Criminal proceedings are, therefore, initiated by the State of Israel in unique representation of the victims' previously unheard, unknown, ai, unnarrated narrative. The exposure of this unknown, unarticulated, and, thus, secret monumental narrative is the trial's goal. In the Nazi scheme, this narrative was meant to be erased as part of the erasure of the Jewish people. The articulation of this narrative as a living, active historical and legal force is, therefore, in itself, an unprecedented act of historic (and not just of legal) justice. By the mere existence of the trial, genocide is countered, vanquished by an act of historical survival. Unaccountable genocidal injustice is countervailed by a rigorously applied procedure of restoration of strict legal accountability and of meticulous justice. "Adolph Eichmann," says the prosecutor at the end of his opening argument, "will enjoy a privilege that he did not accord to even a single one of his victims. He will be able to defend himself before the court. His fate will be decided according to law and according to the evidence, with the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution. And the judges of Israel will pronounce true and righteous judgement." 26 Thus it is that Gideon Hausner, Israel's Attorney
General and the chief prosecutor in this trial, literally frames the accusation in the victims' name, 27 as though speaking for the dead and giving voice, materially, to the six million Jews exterminated by the Nazis:
When I stand before you here, judges of Israel, in this court, to accuse wished me to say on their behalf, had they had the power to brief me as their spokesman, now that the roles were reversed and that the persecuted had become the prosecutors. I knew that the demand for retribution had resounded in many of the last messages bequeathed by the dead: 'Avenge our blood!'... There was no way to implement this in the literal sense. The historic 'vengeance' was Jewish survival itself .... After much heart-searching I felt that I should interpret the last will and testament of the departed as a demand to set a course for scrupulous fairness. For they had been put to death though innocent of any crime. That their chief murderer should now receive a meticulously just trial was the only way they could be truly avenged. This, I thought, would be the real vindication of their memory." Hausner, supra note 4, at 322. Adolph Eichmann, I do not stand alone. With me at this moment stand six million prosecutors. But alas, they cannot rise to level the finger of accusation in the direction of the glass dock and cry out J'accuse against the man who sits there. For their ashes are piled in the hills of Auschwitz and the fields of Treblinka ... Their graves are scattered throughout the length and breadth of Europe. Their blood cries to Heaven, but their voice cannot be heard. Thus it falls to me to be their mouthpiece and to deliver the awesome indictment in their name. 28 Thus the Eichmann trial sets out to perform what I call in using Nietzsche's term "monumental history": it sets out to present a "'monumental' contemplation of the past" that will provide an impulse for a future action and that will analyze events through their effects rather than through their causes, as "events that will have an effect on all ages. "Wherever Jews lived," Arendt insists, "there were recognized Jewish leaders, and this leadership, almost without exception ... cooperated with the Nazis ... I have dealt with this chapter of the story, which the Jerusalem trial failed to put before the eyes of the world in its true dimensions, because it offers the most striking insight into the totality of the moral collapse the Nazis caused ... not only among the persecutors but also among the victims.") "Hausner," writes Tom Segev, "would almost completely ignore the Judenrates," avoiding an exposure of the coerced collaboration of the Jewish Councils in the deportations. In contrast to the state's discretion on, and to the trial's marginalization of, this chapter of collaboration of the Jewish leadership in the death of their own people, the State would try to underscore the victims' heroic activism: Hausner and Ben Gurion organize the trial so that it "would emphasize both the inability of the Jews to resist and their attempts to rebel." Segev, supra note 12, at 348. By highlighting the rare cases of Jewish resistance to the Holocaust, prosecutor Hausner aimed to help young Israelis overcome their "repugnance for the nation's past," a repugnance based on their impression that their grandparents had "allowed themselves to be led like lambs to the slaughter." Hausner, supra note 4. "The younger generation were to learn that Jews were not lambs to be led to the slaughter but, rather, a nation able to defend itself, as in the War of Independence, Ben Gurion told the New York Times." Segev, supra note 12, at 328. Prosecutor Hausner "sought to design a national saga that would echo through the generations," in concert with Ben Gurion's underlying grand vision that "something was required to unite Israeli society -some collective experience, one that would be gripping, purifying, ... a national catharsis." Segev, supra note 12, at 336, 328. I submit that these pragmatic goals, while carried out, were also overwhelmed and exceeded by the subterranean force and the volcanic impact of the trial's reference I am borrowing, however, Nietzsche's concept of "monumentality" and of a monumentalized historical perception in displacement of this concept. In Nietzsche, monumental history records the deeds and actions of great men. Monumentality (endurance of historical effects) consists, in other words, of the generic way in which history is written by great men. In the Eichmann trial, in contrast, as the prosecutor's monumentalizing opening address dramatically makes clear, monumental history consists not of the writing of the great but of the writing of the dead; the monument the trial seeks to build in judging Eichmann is erected not to romantic greatness (not to those who make or have made history) but to the dead (a monument to those who were subject to history).
It is striking that the prosecutor's monumentalized indictment starts with a historical citation. Monumental history is not only the trial's theme and legal subject. History inhabits here the legal utterance stylistically from its first word. In a unique dramatic and rhetorical self-definition, the prosecutor's opening argument initiates itself through the quotation and the recapitulation of another historical speech act of accusation. The six million dead, says the prosecutor, can no longer speak in their own name and formulate their own "J'accuse." It is, therefore, the indictment formulated by the State that will articulate for them their silenced accusation and will thus enable them not simply to accuse but to claim a legal subjectivity -to legally say "I" for the first time.
A. J'accuse
What would it mean for the dead to say "I" through the medium of the trial? 3 ' What is the significance -for those whom history deprived precisely of their "I" -of saying "I accuse" before a court of law and before the world? Why must the dead say "I" precisely in a foreign tongue, in borrowing a French expression? From whom do the dead borrow? What sort of foreign discourse, what legal/literary speech act do the dead quote to say "I accuse" for the first time?
"J'accuse" -"I accuse" -was the title of a famous text of vehement denunciation of racist injustice published in 1898 by the best known French writer of the time, Emile Zola, as an explosive public letter to the President of France and as an artist's intervention in the legal controversy of the Dreyfus affair in France. In 1894, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French army, was convicted of having betrayed military secrets to Germany and sentenced to a solitary life imprisonment in the penal colony Devil's Island. When the fact of espionage was discovered and the military high command was pressured to supply the criminal's identity, it was natural . The Eichmann trial thereby chooses to articulate, quite paradoxically, its very claim to legal originality in reference to (the legal trauma of) a previous trial. 31 "Yes, each dead person leaves a little goods, his memory, and asks that it be taken care of," writes the French historian Jules Michelet. "For the sake of him who has no friends, the magistrate, the judge must substitute for friends. For the law, justice is more reliable than all our forgetful tendernesses, our tears so quickly dried. This magistrate's jurisdiction is History. And the dead are, to borrow an expression from Roman law, these miserabilis personae with whom the judge has to preoccupy himself.
Never in my whole career have I lost sight of this historical duty. I have given to many forgotten dead the assistance of which I myself will have need when the time comes.
I for the army hurriedly to suspect and to scapegoat Dreyfus because he was a Jew. The conviction was obtained through an illegal secret process in a military court. Under the pretext of a threat to State security, the evidence was hidden not just from the public but from the accused and from his lawyer. After the trial, it emerged that the incriminating piece of evidence was a forged document and that the real spy was another officer, Major Esterhazy. But Dreyfus' conviction as a traitor had meanwhile triggered throughout France and its colonies an outburst of anti-Semitic fury. In spite of the accumulating evidence confirming Dreyfus' innocence, the army and the politicians refused to admit their judicial error. A second military court judged Esterhazy only to acquit him and to ratify, thus, through a second trial, the authority of the closed case of Dreyfus' guilt. Appearing in a daily newspaper with the effect of an exploding bomb, Emile Zola's pamphlet publicly accused the army and the government of a cover-up and of a miscarriage of justice. It strongly proclaimed Dreyfus' innocence and advocated the necessity of reopening the case.
It should be noted that Emile Zola's act was historically unprecedented on three counts. 1) This was the first time that a non-Jew had spoken for Jews to publicly accuse -denounce -legal anti-Semitism or racist judicial injustice from the victim's point of view and in the victim's name. 2) In thus protesting for the victim, Zola broke in a revolutionary way with the prevailing Western or Platonic ethical and philosophical tradition, according to which a victim of judicial injustice had to resign himself on moral grounds to the legal authority of the decision wronging him, in order to safeguard the rule of law for culture's and civilization's sake. 32 3) And most important: in an unprecedented manner, Zola mobilizes art as the victim's ally in the victim's struggle against law and against his oppression by the law. It is not by chance that such an accusation against law required art (both marginality and power of expression) to articulate itself. Only an artist could, indeed, take up the challenge of arguing with the legitimacy of an act of State. For the first time, a literary writer understands his task as that of giving legal voice to those whom the law had deprived of voice. In identifying art's voice with the victim's voice, Zola universalized the victim. 32 Thus, Socrates as a condemned philosopher and as role model gives the example of refusing to escape from Athens to avoid the death sentence the polis has unjustifiably inflicted on him. His only recourse, the philosopher tells his disciple
Crito, is persuasion of the court within the legal framework of the trial. Socrates thereby accepts and legally assumes and consummates his role as victim of injustice so as to safeguard (and teach) the supreme principle of the rule of law. Plato, Crito, in 1 The Dialogues of Plato 123-29 (R.E. Allen trans., 1984).
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B. The Truth Is on the March
Zola knew that consequent to his audacious published accusations against the justice system, he himself would unavoidably be charged with libel and be prosecuted for slander of the army and the government. He deliberately put himself up for criminal trial, in order to reopen Dreyfus' closed case. In thus joining the victim of the flagrant injustice and in taking, in his turn, the position and the role of the accused, Zola hoped to force the legal system to review the evidence of Dreyfus' case in a non-military court: he wanted to initiate a legal repetition of Dreyfus' sealed trial through a public -as opposed to the old hidden, secret -legal process and, thereby, to bring to light the Jewish officer's innocence through his own trial. Thus the artist made -at his own cost -a revolutionary intervention in the legal process of the Dreyfus case. The writer chose politically to make creative use of the tool of law in order to break open the closed legal frame.
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But Zola was, in turn, convicted and had to flee from France to England. Finally in 1899, after a change of governments and a long chain of legal twists, Dreyfus was pardoned and, in 1906, fully exonerated and reinstated to his military rank. Zola was no longer alive to witness this longed for triumph. "Let us envy him," Anatole France said at Zola's funeral, "He has honored his country and the world with an immense body of work and a great deed ... For a brief moment, he was the conscience of humanity."" "The truth is on the march," Zola wrote in J'accuse, "and nothing shall stop it ... the act that I hereby accomplish is but a revolutionary means to hasten the explosion of truth and justice. ' 35 In terms that reverberate into our century, Zola charged:
It is a crime to mislead public opinion, to manipulate it for a deathdealing purpose and to pervert it to the point of delirium. It is a crime ... to whip reactionary and intolerant passions into a frenzy while sheltering behind the odious anti-Semitism, of which the great liberal France of the rights of man will die if it is not cured of it. It is a crime to exploit patriotism to further the aims of hatred. And it is a crime to worship the sword as the modem god.
36
"I have but one goal," Zola said in very simple words at the conclusion of J'accuse, "I have but one concern: that light be shed, in the name of mankind which has suffered so much and has a right to happiness": My ardent protest is but a cry from my very soul. Let them dare to summon me before a court of law. Let there be trial in the full light of day.
I am waiting.
37
"France," Zola wrote in another publication printed just a week before J'accuse, France, those are the people I appeal to! They must group together! They must write; they must speak up. They must work with us to enlighten the little people, the humble people who are being poisoned and forced into delirium.
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In his final "Statement to the Jury" at the closure of his trial, Zola said, I did not want my country to remain plunged in lie and injustice. You can strike me here. One day, France will thank me for having helped to save her honor. 
C. Race Hatred, or the Monumental Repetition of a Primal Legal Scene
The pathos of Zola's historical denunciation of nationalistic racism had worked itself into the Eichmann trial, through the relation of the victim's silent, unarticulated cry to the legal articulation of the prosecutorial argument.
With me at this moment stand six million prosecutors. But alas, they cannot rise to level the finger of accusation in the direction of the glass dock and cry out J'accuse against the man who sits there. It is not an accident if, in his opening argument against the Nazi criminal, the Israeli prosecutor picks up on the primal legal scene and on the primal soul cry of Zola's J'accuse, 40 trying to recapitulate at once the moral force of the historical denunciation and the subversive legal gesture, the revolutionary legal meaning of Zola's reversed speech act of accusation.
Monumental history, says Nietzsche, proceeds by analogy. The Dreyfus case in France was both a European trauma and a Jewish trauma. In parallel, the Holocaust in Germany was, on a different and undreamt-of scale, a Jewish trauma that became a European trauma. But Germany, alas, had no Zola.
"While the Dreyfus Affair in its broader political aspects belongs to the twentieth century," writes Hannah Arendt, "the Dreyfus case [is] quite typical of the nineteenth century, when men followed legal proceedings so keenly because each instance afforded a test of the century's greatest achievement, the complete impartiality of the law ... The doctrine of equality before the law was still so firmly implanted in the conscience of the civilized world that a single miscarriage of justice could provoke public indignation from Moscow to New York. The wrong done to a single Jewish officer in France was able to draw from the rest of the world a more vehement and united reaction than all the persecutions of German Jews a generation later., 4 1 All this belongs typically to the nineteenth century and by itself would never have survived two World Wars ... The Dreyfus affair in its political implications could survive because two of its elements grew in importance during the twentieth century. The first is hatred of the Jews. The second, suspicion of the republic itself, of parliament, and the state machine. 42 40 "Ma protestation enflammde n'est que le cri de mon ame," ["My ardent protest is but a cry from my very soul,"] Zola said. The challenge Zola met was that of a translation of "the cry" to a creative legal action. It is a similar challenge that confronts the prosecutor at the Eichmann trial: the central legal question in the trial is how to articulate creatively -yet in a legal idiom that all recognize -the cry? (the victim's cry, the soul cry, the cry of the dead, the cry of history that no one has as yet heard within the space and in the language of a trial). 41 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 91 (Harcourt Brace 1958) (1973) . 42 Id. at 92. Arendt extends her own suspicion of the state machine (normally concentrated on totalitarian abuses of the state machine) to her analysis -and her
The twentieth century repeats and takes to an undreamed extreme the structures of the nineteenth century. Behind the prosecutor's opening citation of Zola's protest, the shadow of Dreyfus stands at the threshhold of the Eichmann trial for a whole historical legal inheritance in which the Jew is the perennial accused in a lynch justice. In twentieth-century Nazi Germany, as in Dreyfus' nineteenth-century France, persecution ratifies itself as persecution in and through civilization -by the civilized means of the law. The Wannsee Conference legalizing genocide as a sweeping indictment and penalization of all Jews by virtue of their being Jews is but the crowning culmination of this history. As the secretary of that conference who transcribed it while feeling not merely innocent, but as he testified, "like Pontius Pilate" innocented by its verdict on the Jews, 4 3 as the ruthless agent of administrative genocide and as the Nazis' so-called "Jewish specialist," Eichmann is an emblem of this history. But this whole insidious framework of legal persecution and of legalized abuse can now, for the first time, be dismantled legally, since Zionism has provided a tribunal (a state justice) in critique (her "critical history") of the State of Israel's handling of the Eichmann trial. In this sense, Arendt formulates her own J'accuse against the state and its judicial system (the non-separation between state and church that she sarcastically equates with reverse racism: Israeli law indicted right at the outset; Arendt, supra note 1, at 6-7). Arendt speaks truth to power, unwittingly adopting in her turn Zola's anti-religious, anti-racist, anti-nationalistic, anti-statist stance. Arendt challenges, indeed, Hausner's prerogative to quote Zola in pointing out that Hausner is "a government-appointed agent," not a defiant individual who undertakes to challenge the very justice of the state and the legitimacy of the state's implementation of its judicial system. With her usual sarcasm focused on the chief prosecutor, Arendt writes: "The 'J'accuse', so indispensable from the viewpoint of the victim, sounds, of course, much more convincing in the mouth of a man who has been forced to take the law into his own hands than in the mouth of a government-appointed official who risks nothing." Arendt, supra note 1, at 266. Ironically and without meaning to do so, Arendt will also, like Zola, open herself to trial by the defenders of the state. The Dreyfus affair is thus, in more than one sense, archetypal of positions in the Eichmann trial. The Eichmann trial takes place in the shadow of the distant lessons and of the structural cross-legal memory of the Dreyfus case. See supra note 28. 43 Compare Arendt's report in Eichmann in Jerusalem: "The aim of the conference was to coordinate all efforts toward the implementation of the Final Solution ...
• It was a very important occasion for Eichmann, who had never before mingled socially with so many 'high personnages' ... . He had sent out the invitations and had prepared some statistical material ... for Heydrich's introductory speech -eleven million Jews had to be killed, an undertaking of some magnitude -and later he had to prepare the minutes. In short, he acted as secretary of the meeting. There was another reason that made the day of that conference unforgettable for Eichmann. Although he had been doing his best right along to help in the Final Solution, he had still harbored some doubts about 'such a bloody solution [Vol. 1:465 which the Jew's victimization can be, for the first time, legally articulated. In doing justice and in exercising sovereign Israeli jurisdiction, the Eichmann trial tries to legally reverse the long tradition of traumatization of the Jew by means of law. The voiceless Jew or the perennial accused can for the first time speak, say "I" and voice his own "J'accuse." "This," Prime Minister Ben Gurion said, "is not an ordinary trial nor only a trial":
Here, for the first time in Jewish history, historical justice is being done by the sovereign Jewish people. For many generations it was we who suffered, who were tortured, were killed -and we who were judged. Our adversaries and our murderers were also our judges. For the first time Israel is judging the murderers of the Jewish people. It is not an individual that is at the dock at this historic trial, and not the Nazi regime alone, but anti-Semitism throughout history. The judges whose business is the law and who may be trusted to adhere to it will judge Eichmann the man for his horrible crimes, but responsible public opinion in the world will be judging anti-Semitism, which paved the way for this most atrocious crime in the history of mankind. And let us bear in mind that only the independence of Israel could create the necessary conditions for this historic act of justice.'
III. ARENDT'S OBJECTIONS
Arendt disputes this vision of the trial and rejects the monumental history that it constructs on two conceptual grounds -the first, juridical, linked to a different conception of the function of the trial (based on a different, more conservative philosophy of law), and the second, epistemological, linked to a different historical perception of the Holocaust and amounting, ultimately, to a different philosophy of history. On both historical and legal grounds, Arendt takes issue with the very narrative perspective that puts the victims at the center of the trial. At odds with the narrative effort of the State, Arendt's competing effort is to decenter systematically the prosecution's story 45 and to focus the historical perception that transpires not on the victim, but on the criminal and on the nature of the crime.
A. For a More Conservative Philosophy of Law:
Arendt's Jurisprudential Argument
The prosecutor's grandiose rhetoric of -speaking for the dead, the monumentalized indictment uttered in the name and in the voice of the deceased, undermines for Arendt the sobriety of the proceedings, since what is presented as the victims' outcry -the victims' search for justice and accountability -might be perceived as a desire for revenge. But if the prosecutor's public anger is what the cry of the deceased amounts to, Arendt would rather do without that cry. A courtroom is, indeed, no place for cries. Justice for Arendt is a thoroughly ascetic, disciplined conceptual experience, not an emotional stage for spectacular public expression. "Justice" -Arendt protests -"does not permit anything of the sort; it demands seclusion, it permits sorrow rather than anger. And it prescribes the most careful abstention from all the nice pleasures of putting oneself in the limelight." 4 6
Justice demands that the accused be prosecuted, defended, and judged, and that all the other questions of seemingly greater import ... be left in abeyance. Justice insists on the importance of Adolph Eichmann, 45 Arendt thus offers what Henry Louis Gates calls a "countemarrative" to the official story of the Eichmann trial. "People," writes Gates, "arrive at an understanding of themselves and the world through narratives -narratives purveyed by schoolteachers, newscasters, 'authorities', and all the other authors of our common sense. Counternarratives are, in turn, the means by which a group contests that dominant reality and the framework of assumptions that supports it. Sometimes delusion lies that way, sometimes not. There's a sense in which much of black history is simply counternarrative that has been documented and legitimized, by slow, hard-won scholarship." Henry Louis Gates, Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man 106-07 (1997). Arendt's critical history is the decanonizing and iconoclastic counternarrative of a resistant reader, whose faith is in diversity and separation (rather than in unity and in communal solidarity).and who speaks truth to power, from a "position ... close to the classical anarchist -with anarchy understood to mean the absence of rulers, not the absence of law." (I am borrowing this definition of the anarchist position from Robert Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, in Narrative, Violence, and the Law, supra note 10, at 175). 46 Arendt, supra note 1, at 5. his deeds, not the sufferings of the Jews, not the German people or mankind, not even anti-Semitism or racism.
47
The jurisprudential understanding of a crime cannot be focused on the victim. A criminal is tried not with the aim of vengeance on the part of those whom he has injured, but in order to repair the community that he has endangered by his action. "Criminal proceedings," Arendt writes, "since they are mandatory and initiated even if the victim would prefer to forgive and forget, rest on laws whose 'essence' ... is that a crime is not committed only against the victim but primarily against the community whose law is violated ... it is the general public order that has been thrown out of gear and must be restored, as it were. It is, in other words, the law, not the plaintiff, that must prevail.
B. For a Less Conservative Philosophy of History:
Arendt's Historiographical Argument
The second argument Arendt articulates as an objection to the trial's focus on the victims is historical and epistemological. The trial perceives Nazism as the monstrous culmination and as the traumatic repetition of a monumental history of anti-Semitism. But for Arendt, this victim's perspective, this traumatized perception of history as the eternal repetition of catastrophe, is numbing. 49 Arendt does not put it quite so literally: I am translating freely what I feel to be the intellectual and the emotional thrust of her argument. Repeated trauma causes numbness. But law cannot indulge in numbness. As a typical response to trauma, numbness may be a legitimate effect of history; it cannot be a legitimate effect of law, the language of sharpened awareness. A trial, Arendt deeply and intensely feels, is supposed to be precisely a translation of the trauma into consciousness. But here the numbing trauma is mixed into 47 Id. 48 Arendt, supra note 1, at 261. In Arendt's eyes, the focus on the victims trivializes both the nature of the accusation (the indictment) and the nature of the crime (of the offense). "For just as a murderer is prosecuted because he has violated the law of the community, and not because he has deprived the Smith family of its husband, father and breadwinner, so these modem, state-employed murderers must be prosecuted because they violated the order of mankind, not because they killed millions of people." Arendt, supra note 1, at 273. 49 Compare Hausner, supra note 4, at 331 (emphasis added): "It was often excruciating merely to listen to one of these tales. Sometimes we felt as if our reactions were paralyzed, and we were benumbed. It was a story with an unending climax." the form of the trial itself. In litigating and in arguing the charges on the basis of a numbing repetition of catastrophe, Jewish historical consciousness -and the trial as a whole -submit to the effects of trauma instead of remedying it. History becomes the illustration of what is already known. But the question is precisely how to learn something new from history. In the Israeli vision of the trial, the monumental, analogical perception of the repetition of the trauma of anti-Semitism screens the new: it hides from view precisely the unprecedented nature of the Nazi crime, which is neither a development nor a culmination of what went before, but is separated from the history preceding it by an abyss. This abyss -this epistemological rupture -is what the Eichmann trial and its monumental history fail to perceive in Arendt's eyes. This radical critique encapsulates Arendt's revolutionary concept of the Holocaust, as opposed to her conservative legal approach and her conservative jurisprudential argument. I will argue in what follows that the Eichmann trial is, at the antipodes of Arendt, historiographically conservative but jurisprudentially revolutionary. Arendt, on the contrary, is historiographically revolutionary but jurisprudentially conservative. I will further argue that the paradox of Eichmann in Jerusalem proceeds from the creative tension between Arendt's philosophical, historiographical, and epistemological radicalism and her jurisprudential conservatism.
The Holocaust, Arendt contends, requires a historiographical radicalism. But the Eichmann trial is -quite disappointingly -not capable of such a radical historical approach. It fails to give a revolutionary lesson for the future because it is imprisoned in the endless repetition of a catastrophic past. It is locked up in trauma and in repetition as a construct that prevents a grasp of the unprecedented. "I have insisted," Arendt writes, "on ... how little Israel, and the Jewish people in general, was prepared to recognize, in the crimes that Eichmann was accused of, an unprecedented crime":
In the eyes of the Jews, thinking exclusively in terms of their own history, the catastrophe that had befallen them under Hitler, in which a third of the people perished, appeared not as the most recent of crimes, the unprecedented crime of genocide, but on the contrary, as the oldest crime they knew and remembered. This misunderstanding ... is actually at the root of all the failures and the shortcomings of the Jerusalem trial. None of the participants ever arrived at a clear understanding of the actual horror ofAuschwitz, which is of a different nature from all the atrocities of the past ... Politically and legally, ... [Vol. 1:465 Theaters of Justice these were "crimes" different not only in degree of seriousness but in essence.
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IV. EXTENDING THE LIMITS OF PERCEPTION
Arendt thus situates the problematic of the Eichmann trial in a particularly meaningful relation between repetition and the new, between a memory of history and law as an experience and a discipline of precedents, and the necessity to break fresh ground, to project into the future and into the structure of the precedent the legal meaning of the unexampled and the unprecedented. I will argue, in my turn, that in focusing on repetition and its limits in the Eichmann trial, Arendt fails to see the way in which the trial in effect does not repeat the victim's story, but historically creates it for the first time. I submit, in other words, that the Eichmann trial legally creates a radically original and new event: not a rehearsal of a given story, but a groundbreaking narrative event that is itself historically and legally unprecedented.
"Universalist philosophers," writes Richard Rorty, "assume, with Kant, that all the logical space necessary for moral deliberation is now available -that all important truths about right and wrong can not only be stated, but be made plausible, in language already to hand."'" As a believer in the universalist language of the law, Arendt makes such an assumption in coming to Jerusalem and in reporting as she does on the trial's shortcomings. But the Eichmann trial, I would argue, strives precisely to expand the space available for moral deliberation through law. The trial shows how the unprecedented nature of the injury inflicted on the victims cannot be simply stated in a language that is already at hand. I would argue that the trial struggles to create a new space, a language that is not yet in existence. This new legal language and this new space in which Western rationality as such shifts its horizon and extends its limits are created here perhaps for the first time in history precisely by the victims' first-hand narrative.
A. Private and Public
Over a hundred witnesses appear with the determination to translate their private traumas to the public space. To her surprise, Arendt is so moved by 50 Arendt, supra note 1, at 267 (emphasis added). 51 Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, 30 Mich. Q. Rev. 231-32 (1991). some of the testimonies that she can uncharacteristically, at moments, think uncritically and, as she puts it, "foolishly: 'Everyone, everyone should have his day in court'." 52 In general, however, Arendt has a hard time stomaching the testimonial exhibition of atrocities and finds the listening profoundly taxing. 53 She is embarrassed by the unreserved disclosures of human degradation and is deeply discomforted by what she experiences as an exposure of the private to the public ear:
... this audience was filled with "survivors", ... immigrants from Europe, like myself, who knew by heart all there was to know 54 ...
As witness followed witness and horror was piled on horror, they sat there and listened in public to stories they would hardly have been able to endure in private, when they would have had to face the storyteller.
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In relegating the victim experience to the private realm and in expressing her discomfort at the mixture of the private and the public, Arendt fails to recognize, however, how the very essence of the trial consists in a juridical and social reorganization of the two spheres and in a restructuring of their jurisprudential and political relation to each other. 56 Beyond the incidental 52 Arendt, supra note 1, at 229. 53 The difficulty of listening was underscored even by the prosecutor. "The narratives," he later writes, "were so overwhelming, so shocking, that we almost stopped observing the witnesses and their individual mannerisms. What impressed itself on the mind was an anonymous cry; it could have been voiced by any one of the millions who had passed through that Gehenna. The survivors who appeared before us were almost closer to the dead than to the living, for each had only the merest chance to thank for his survival ... It was often excruciating merely to listen to one of these tales. Sometimes we felt as if our reactions were paralyzed, and we were benumbed. It was a story with an unending climax. Often I heard loud sobbing behind me in the courtroom. Sometimes there was a commotion, when the ushers removed a listener who had fainted. Newspaper reporters would rush out after an hour or two, explaining that they could not take it without a pause ...
The prosecution team was thankful for the 'documentation sessions."' Hausner, supra note 4, at 227, 331. 54 "I was there, and I don't know. How can you possibly know when you were elsewhere?" Elie Wiesel asked Hannah Arendt. "Her reply: 'You're a novelist; you can cling to questions. I deal with human and political sciences. I have no right not to find answers."' I Elie Wiesel, All Rivers Run to the Sea: Memoirs (1928 Memoirs ( -1969 Memoirs ( ) 348 (1995 . 55 Arendt, supra note 1, at 8. 56 In consciously unsettling the dichotomy (the segregation and the opposition) between [Vol. 1:465 Theaters of Justice scope of Arendt's reservations and of her anger at what she experiences as an invasion of the public by the private, I argue that the trial is, primarily and centrally, a legal process of translation of thousands of private, secret traumas into one collective, public, and communally acknowledged one. the private and the public, the Eichmann trial is, in 1961, ahead of other legal movements (such as feminism, black studies, gay studies) that would equally seek to unsettle this dichotomy in their political struggles during the seventies, the eighties, and the nineties.
For feminist critiques of the public/private divide, see, for example, Carole Rev. 1349 Rev. (1982 .
In her perspicacious analysis of the Eichmann trial, Pnina Lahav analyzed the trial's deconstruction of the private/public dichotomy with respect not to the victim experience but to the fact of Jewishness and to its relevance. Lahav, supra note 1. See also Lahav, supra note 6, at 145-64; Annette Wieviorka, L'Avnement du timoin, in L'Ere du t6moin 81-126 (1998) .
For analyses of the ways in which Arendt's political theory contested traditional understandings of private and public (based on Arendt's own analytical distinction between "the Private" and "the Public" and between "the Social" and "the Political"
in The Human Condition and in On Revolution), see Benhabib, supra note 2, at 173-215; Hanna Fenischel Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, in Hanna Arendt: Critical Essays, supra note 2, at 261-88; Dossa, supra note 2.
B. The Revolution in the Victim
But such translation is not given. The victim's story has to overcome not just the silence of the dead, but the indelible coercive power of the oppressor's terrifying, brutal silencing of the surviving and the inherent, speechless silence of the living in the face of an unthinkable, unknowable, ungraspable event. "Even those who were there don't know Auschwitz ... For Auschwitz is another planet," 5 7 testifies a writer named K-Zetnik, who cannot complete his testimony since he literally loses consciousness and faints upon the witness stand. "That mute cry," he later will write, "was again trying to break loose, as it had every time death confronted me at Auschwitz; and, as always when I looked death in the eye, so now too the mute scream got no further than my clenched teeth that closed upon it and locked it inside me. " 58 But what can I do when I'm struck mute? I have neither word nor name for it all. Genesis says: "And Adam gave names ..." When God finished creating the earth and everything upon it, Adam was asked to give names to all that God had created. Till 1942 there was no Auschwitz in existence. For Auschwitz there is no name other than Auschwitz. My heart will be ripped to pieces if I say, "In Auschwitz they burned people alive!" Or "In Auschwitz people died of starvation." For that is not Auschwitz. People have died of starvation before, and people did burn alive before. But that is not Auschwitz. What, then, is Auschwitz? I have no words to express it; I don't have a name for it. Auschwitz is a primal phenomenon. I don't have the key to unlock it. But don't the tears of the mute speak his anguish? And don't his screams cry his distress? Don't his bulging eyes reveal the horror? I am that mute. 59 In the film Shoah, two survivors of Vilna, Motke Zaidl and Itzhak Dugin, testify about the Nazi plan in 1944 to open the graves and to cremate the corpses, so as to literally erase all traces of the genocide:
The last graves were the newest, and we started with the oldest, those of the first ghetto ... The deeper you dug, the flatter the bodies were ... When you tried to grasp a body, it crumbled, it was impossible to pick up. We had to open the graves, but without tools ... Anyone who 57 Ka Tzetnik 135633, Shivitti. A Vision at x (Eliyah Nike De-Nur & Lisa Herman trans., 1987) (I am using Arendt's orthographe to transcribe the writer's name ("K-Zetnik")). 58 Id. at 1-2 (translation modified). 59 Id. at 31-32 (translation modified). [Vol. 1:465 Theaters of Justice said "corpse" or "victim" was beaten. The Germans made us refer to the bodies as Figuren. 
60
A victim is, by definition, not only one who is oppressed, but one who has no language of his own, one who, quite precisely, is robbed of a language with which to articulate his or her victimization.
6
' What is available to him as language is only the oppressor's language. But in the oppressor's language, the abused will sound crazy, even to himself, if he describes himself as abused. -13 (1985) . 61 This definition is inspired by the analysis of the political psychiatrist Thomas Szatz, in his book Ideology and Insanity, Essays on the Psychiatric Dehumanization of Man 5 (1970): "Rulers have always conspired against their subjects and sought to keep them in bondage; and, to achieve their aims, they have always relied on force and fraud. Indeed, when the justificatory rhetoric with which the oppressor conceals and misrepresents his true aims and methods is most effective -... the oppressor succeeds not only in subduing his victim but also in robbing him of a vocabulary for articulating his victimization, thus making him a captive deprived of all means of escape." Compare the philosophical analysis of Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute 3, 5 (Georges Van Den Abbeele trans., 1988): "You are informed that human beings endowed with language were placed in a situation such that none of them is now able to tell about it. Most of them disappeared then, and the survivors rarely speak about it. When they do speak about it, their testimony bears only upon a minute part of this situation. How can you know that the situation itself existed?... In all of these cases, to the privation constituted by the damage is added the impossibility of bringing it to the knowledge of others, and in particular to the knowledge of a tribunal. In the new language that it is the function of the Eichmann trial to invent and to articulate from scratch, the Jews have to emerge precisely from the "sub-humanity" that has been linguistically impressed on them even inside themselves by the oppressor's language. "We were the bearers of the secret," says Philip Muller, ex-Sonderkommando member, in the film Shoah:
We were reprieved dead men. We weren't allowed to talk to anyone, or contact any prisoner, or even the SS. Only those in charge of the Aktion. 64 Because history by definition silences the victim, the reality of degradation and of suffering -the very facts of victimhood and of abuse -are intrinsically inaccessible to history. But the legally creative vision of the Eichmann trial consists in the undoing of this inaccessibility. The Eichmann trial is the victims' trial only insofar as it is now the victims who, against all odds, are precisely writing their own history.
To enable such a writing through which the mute bearers of a traumatizing destiny become the speaking subjects of a history, the Eichmann trial must enact not simply memory, but memory as change. It must dramatize upon its legal stage before the audience nothing less than a conceptual revolution in the victim. And this, in fact, is what the trial does. In this sense, the Eichmann trial is, I would submit, a revolutionary trial. 65 It is this revolutionary transformation of the victim that makes the victim's story happen for the first time and happen as a legal act of authorship of history. This historically unprecedented revolution in the victim which was operated in and by the Eichmann trial is, I would suggest, the trial's major contribution not only to Jews, but to history, to law, to culture -to humanity at large. I will further argue that as a singular legal event, the Eichmann trial calls for a rethinking -and sets in motion a transvaluation -of the structures and the values of conventional criminal law. 66 63 Lanzmann, supra note 60, at 12. 64 Id. at 68. 65 Arendt does not see the trial as a revolution. She does not underscore or does not fully recognize the revolutionary dimension of the trial. I will argue nonetheless that it is, among others, her newborn interest in revolutions -the subject of the book on which she works already and that will become precisely the successor to the Eichmann book -that inadvertently, intuitively draws her to the trial in Jerusalem.
66 From a different vantage point, compare Mark Osiel's analysis of the limits of [Vol. 1:465 
Theaters of Justice
It is a well-known fact that prior to the Eichmann trial, the Holocaust traditional criminal law in its response to administrative massacre. "Alongside such Promethean aspirations," Osiel remarks, "the traditional purposes of criminal law -deterrence and retribution of culpable wrongdoing -are likely to seem quite pedestrian ... As an aim for criminal law, the cultivation of collective memory resembles deterrence in that it is directed toward the future, where enhanced solidarity is sought. But like retribution, it looks to the past, to provide the narrative content of what is to be shared in memory." Osiel, supra note 16, at 463, 474.
My own argument concerns not simply the purposes of criminal law in their excess of traditional conceptions, but what I have called the conceptual revolution in the very status of the victims operated by and through the Eichmann trial. My claim is that the posture of the Eichmann trial with respect to victims is unique -and different from the legally familiar definitions of the issues for debate, currently discussed in legal scholarship through its contemporary reassessment and reformulation of the role of victims in criminal trials. Within the context of these contemporary debates, Paul Gewirtz notes how "modern law enforcement continues to struggle to find an appropriate place for victims and survivors in the criminal process ... Indeed, no movement in criminal law has been more powerful in the past twenty years than the victims' rights movement, which has sought to enhance the place of the victim in the criminal trial process." Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial, in Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, supra note 2, at 139. "In 1982 alone," writes Lynne N. Henderson, "California voters approved a 'Victims' Bill of Rights' that made substantial changes in the California law ... Although 'victims' rights' may be viewed as a populist movement responding to perceived injustices in the criminal process, genuine questions about victims and victimization have become increasingly coopted by the concerns of advocates of the 'crime control' model of criminal justice." Lynn N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims ' Rights, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 937 (1985) . Martha Minow "worries," thus, about "the contemporary prevalence in legal and political arenas of victim stories": "One who claims to be a victim invites, besides sympathy, two other responses: 'I didn't do it', and 'I am a victim, too'. No wonder," Minow writes, "[that] some describe contemporary political debates as exhibitions of 'one-downmanship' or as the 'oppression Olympics.' Victim stories risk trivializing pain and obscuring the metric or vantage point for evaluating competing stories of pain. Victim stories often also adhere to an unspoken norm that prefers narratives of helplessness to stories of responsibility, and tales of victimization to narratives of human agency and capacity." Minow, supra note 2, at 31-32.
Arendt objects, precisely, to the focus on the victims in the Eichmann trial because she too prefers existential "stories of responsibility" to "narratives of helplessness." My point is different and could be summarized as follows: 1) In 1961, the Eichmann trial gives a central role to victims in historical anticipation of the political emergence of the question of the victim at the forefront of criminal jurisprudential debates today. 2) What is at issue in the Eichmann trial is not (what today's scholars focus on as) "victims' rights" but rather (what I will define as) the question of the victims' (legal was not discussed in Israel, but was rather struck by shame, silence, and and historical) authority (see infra Conclusion: The Web of Stories), insofar as this newborn authority changes not simply our ethical perception of the victim but our cognitive perception of history.
3) The debates on "victims' rights" perceive the victims as individuals; the Eichmann trial creates a collective, a community of victims. 4) Ordinarily (in current legal discourse and analysis) the victim is perceived in opposition to the state or as victimized mainly by the state. (Although there are moments in which the state divides against itself to correct its own abuses, as in the case of the American Civil Rights Law enforced by the Federal government against the resistance of individual states.) The Eichmann trial is a unique moment and a unique case in which the state defends the victims, who were made victims by another state. The trial performs a unique exchange between victims and state, in that, through the trial, victims and state mutually transform each other's political identity. The state that represents the victims plans the trial, and the victims' stories add up to a saga and create the case of the state which, in its turn, creates a transformation (here analyzed as a conceptual revolution) in the victims. 5) My approach in this respect is therefore different both from Arendt and from her opponents: it is distinct from the accepted interpretations of the role of the victims in the Eichmann trial. In my view, the victims/witnesses are not simply expressing their suffering: they are reclaiming legal subjecthood and autobiographical personhood. They change within the trial from being merely victims to something else. They are carrying out a prosecution (a J'accuse articulated through a legal process). Through this recovery of speech and this recovery of history, they reinvent an innovative logos that is no longer simply victims' logos, but constitutes a new kind of legal language. In the act of claiming their humanity, their history, their story, and their voice before the law and before the world, they are actively (and sovereignly) reborn from a kind of social death into a new life. 6) Arendt sees and takes great pains to point out the danger inherent in the fact that the state creates a monumental history: for her, the combination of monumental history with the self-authorization of the state spells Fascism. My argument, however, is that, although the Eichmann trial was monumental history created by the state for political purposes that were particularist and Zionist-nationalistic, the consequences of the trial were momentous, in that the trial has in fact created (or enacted) a universalization of the victim. Thus, the trial as event exceeded and surpassed the intentions of its planners.
Legal scholars continue to debate the proper role for victims in criminal prosecutions. For a contemporary victim-oriented vision of criminal justice, see George P. Fletcher, With Justice for Some: Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials (1995) . Fletcher argues that " [t] he minimal task of the criminal trial ... is to stand by victims, to restore their dignity, to find a way for them to think of themselves, once again, as men and women equal to all others." Id. at 6. For a critique of Fletcher's approach, see Robert P. Mosteller, Book Review, Popular Justice, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 487 (1995) . For an overview of the law surrounding victims, see Douglas E. Beloof, Victims in Criminal Procedure (1999) .
For discussions of the modem victims' rights movement in criminal law, see [Vol. 1:465 Theaters of Justice widespread denial. 67 Holocaust survivors did not talk about their past, and when they did, they were not listened to. Their memories were sealed in muteness and in silence. Their stories often were kept secret even from their families. The emotional explosion triggered by the Eichmann trial and by the revolution in the victims it dramatically and morally effected publicly unlocked this silence. Now, for the first time, victims were legitimized and validated and their newborn discourse was empowered by their new roles not as victims but as prosecution witnesses within the trial. I argue that a new moral perception was made possible precisely by this change of role and change of status. "Injustices," says Rorty in a different context, Injustices may not be perceived as injustices, even by those who suffer them, until somebody invents a previously unplayed role. Only if somebody has a dream, and a voice to describe that dream, does what looked like nature begin to look like culture, what looked like fate begin to look like a moral abomination.
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The trial was, thus, a transforming act of law and justice: a Jewish past that formerly had meant only a crippling disability was now being reclaimed as an empowering and proudly shared political and moral identity. Living Israelis were connecting to the dead European Jews in the emerging need to share the Holocaust. 69 Broadcast live over the radio and passionately listened to, the trial was becoming the central event in the country's life. Victims were, thus, for the first time, gaining what as victims they precisely could not have: authority; historical authority, that is to say, semantic authority over themselves and over others. Ultimately, I would argue, the acquisition of semantic authority by victims is what the trial was about.
CONCLUSION: THE WEB OF STORIES
Prior to the Eichmann trial, what we call the Holocaust did not exist as a collective story. It did not exist as a semantically authoritative story. 7 0 "Where there is experience in the strict sense of the word," writes Walter Benjamin, "certain contents of the individual past combine with 68 Rorty, supra note 51, at 233. 69 "It came as a discovery to many that we were actually a nation of survivors,"
prosecutor Hausner noted in his memoirs of the trial, "The editor of a leading newspaper told me, after listening to the shattering evidence of a woman witness in court: 'For years I have been living next to this woman, without so much as an inkling of who she was.' It now transpired that almost everyone in Israel had such a neighbor." Hausner, supra note 4, at 453. 70 Semantic authority is, among others things, what endows a story with transmissibility and unforgettability. "Not only a man's knowledge," writes Walter Benjamin, "but above all his real life ... first assume transmissible form at the moment of his death. Just as a sequence of images is set in motion inside a man as his life comes to an end -unfolding the views of himself under which he has encountered himself without being aware of it -suddenly in his expressions and looks the unforgettable emerges and imparts to everything that concerned him that authority which even the poorest wretch in dying possesses for the living around him. This authority is at the very source of the story. Death is the sanction of everything that the storyteller has to tell. He has borrowed his authority from death." Walter Benjamin, The Storyteller, in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations. Essays and Reflections 94 (Hannah Arendt ed., 1968) .
On "the mystical foundation of authority" in law and jurisprudence, see Jacques Derrida, Force of Law, in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 919 (1990) . [Vol. 1:465 material from the collective past" '7 ' to form an "image of a collective experience to which even the deepest shock of every individual experience, death, constitutes no impediment or barrier":
Memory creates the chain of experience which passes a happening from generation to generation. It starts the web which all stories together form in the end. One ties on to the next, as the great storytellers ... have always readily known. 7 3 It is this new collective story that did not exist prior to the trial -a story at the same time of the victims' suffering and of the victims' recovery of language -and the newly acquired semantic and historical authority of this revolutionary story that, for the first time, create what we know today as the Holocaust: a theme of international discussion and of world conversation designating the experience of the victims and referring to the crime against the Jewish people independently from the political and military story of the Second World War.
Israel's claim to a law through Eichmann's judgment and the monumental legal history constructed by the trial have, thus, to some extent, fulfilled the mission of the law to be, in Robert Cover's concept, "a bridge to the future." "Law," writes the renowned American legal philosopher in his article Folktales of Justice, "Law is neither to be wholly identified with the understanding of the present state of affairs nor with the imagined alternatives. It is the bridge -... a bridge built out of committed social behavior." 74 Law ratifies an aspect of commitment in our lives, and the commitment obligates itself toward a future that we hope will be a better future. Our legal commitments are, in turn, formed by lessons and prescriptions we derive from narratives about the past and from our readings of these narratives. "No set of legal institutions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning," Cover reminds us, For every constitution there is an epic, for every decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live. 75 For the world to be livable after the Holocaust, a human narrative of the past catastrophe and of the past devastation needed to be legally articulated and combined with future rules of law. The legal narrative of Nuremberg did not suffice, since it did not articulate the victims' story, but subsumed it in the general political and military story of the War.
What Nuremberg did do (and this was its unmatched juridical accomplishment) was to establish an unprecedented legal concept of "1crimes against humanity" and to set up the death penalty against the Nazi perpetrators of these crimes as a new norm or new legal precedent. "We have also incorporated its principles into a judicial precedent," writes Justice Robert Jackson, the architect and chief prosecutor of the Nuremberg Trials, "The power of the precedent," Mr. Justice Cardozo said, "is the power of the beaten path." One of the chief obstacles to this trial was the lack of a beaten path. A judgement such as has been rendered shifts the power of the precedent to the support of these rules of law. No one can hereafter deny or fail to know that the principles on which the Nazi leaders are adjudged to forfeit their lives constitute law -and law with a sanction. 76 
